Extended mind
Definition here: the thesis that cognition is distributed across minds and external structures rather than confined to the brain. sole-2026-llm-cognitive-virus names it as the philosophical frame for its model and cites Clark and Chalmers, Analysis 58, 7 (1998). The primary text is not read in this vault; this page records the role the paper gives it.
The paper’s use of it
The paper treats external structures as more than storage. Such artifacts reshape cognitive tasks, following Norman (1991) and Hutchins (1995). They can be complementary, strengthening capacities beyond their immediate use, or competitive, improving performance while weakening the underlying skill. Language is the paper’s example of a two-sided cognitive technology: it externalizes, stabilizes, and recombines thought, while linguistic categories and narratives reshape perception and reasoning.
Its role in the LLM argument
The extended-mind frame is what lets the paper describe LLM coupling as an addition to an ecology of cognition rather than a tool bolted on. Uncoupled users already run cognition across books, writing, computers, and the Internet. The LLM becomes one more component, and the paper’s question is whether it joins that set or replaces it. That question is the scaffolding-vs-substitution split.